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Colorado’s Denver-Julesberg Basin, a massive oil and gas play in 
Northeastern Colorado, is no stranger to controversy. For the past thirty 
years, litigators, judges, mayors, and counties became accustomed to 
renditions of the same gladiatorial fight. The old script went something like 
this: intrepid, environmentally conscious city imposed a moratorium on oil 
and gas operations.
1
 Not to be intimidated by a shrimp, the bold oil and gas 
industry then moved to enjoin the moratorium on the basis that state law 
preempted the local law.
2
 In each case, the local government perished by 
the sword of state law. Despite these outcomes, new local challengers 
continued to step into the great Colosseum of the Denver-Julesberg Basin – 
almost certain to crumble under the superior might of the state law. Why 
then, did counties and cities continue to step into the arena armed only with 
the seemingly meager slingshot that is local law? Local entities didn’t 
litigate these issues merely to waste resources or appease constituents 
apprehensive of fracking. Every good underdog clings to some hope that 
victory is within reach.  
For these cities and towns, that hope is Article XX of the Colorado 
Constitution.  Article XX means Colorado is an imperium in imperio state.
3
 
Imperium in imperio, or an empire within an empire, generally means 
Colorado grants chartered cities plenary power to regulate matters of local 
concern.
4
 For much of the early 20th century, the powers conferred to cities 
were generally respected.
5
 In other words, the slingshot wielded by local 
entities was, at one point, a formidable bow. However, tides of the courts 
are subject to change. In the past half century, the courts began to construe 
local powers under Article XX to be less powerful than originally thought.
6
 
This trend continues today. In regionalism debates collateral to the courts’ 
decisions, local entities asserting power under Article XX are sometimes 
characterized as selfish players wielding power detrimental to the state as a 
                                                                                                             
 1. See generally City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 
2016); City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016); Voss v. 
Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992). 
 2. See generally Fort Collins, 369 P.3d 586; Longmont, 369 P.3d 573; Voss, 830 P.2d 
1061. 
 3. See Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at Home 
Rule, 34 ENERGY L.J. 261, 276 (2013).   
 4. John E. Hayes & Kristy M. Hartl, Home Rule in Colorado: Evolution or Devolution, 
33 COLO. LAW. 61, 61 (2004).  
 5. Id.  
 6. See id. 
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  The counterargument to these characterizations is that local entities 
should be free to govern in a manner tailored to the interests of their 
constituents so long as these local regulations do not conflict with the 
Constitution or laws of the State.
8
 So, the thrust of this argument, that local 
regulations restricting the development of oil and gas stand so long as they 
do not conflict with the Oil and Gas Conservation Act (“OGCA”), 
propelled local litigants into the colosseum. 
Perhaps the General Assembly became weary of the spectacles of the 
colosseum because in 2019, the General Assembly passed, and the 
Governor signed into law Senate Bill 19-181 (“The Bill”).
9
  The Bill brings 
comprehensive reforms to the statutory companion of Article XX and the 
OGCA. Prior to The Bill, the OGCA directed the Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (“COGCC”) to act in a manner that “foster[ed]” 
the industry.
10
 Now, the COGCC is tasked with regulating the oil and gas 
industry “in a manner that protects public health, safety, and welfare, 
including protection of the environment and wildlife resources.”
11
 This 
change in ethos is reflected throughout the newly amended OGCA: greater 
setbacks are required, forced pooling requirements are more stringent, 
membership of the COGCC is now more representative of non-industry 
persons, and the surface use rights of land owners are stronger.
12
  
Of all the changes The Bill brings, the most interesting is its treatment of 
local entities. The Bill amends the statutory companion to Article XX – the 
Land Use Enabling Act (“LUEA”)
13
. Under the newly amended LUEA, the 
siting of oil and gas well locations are contemplated as areas of local 
interest.
14
 Significantly, this treatment of wells as areas of local interest 
grants county and municipal governments more power to regulate land use 
activities as they relate to oil and gas. This designation carries over into the 
OGCA which now expressly conditions state approval of drilling permits 
                                                                                                             
 7. See id. at 62.  
 8. See generally City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465 (1893) (noting 
that certain municipalities are entitled to imperium in imperio treatment).  
 9. See S.B. 19-181, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); Judith Kohler, 
Gov. Jared Polis Ushers in New Era of Drilling Regulation, but are “Oil and Gas Wars” 
Over?, THE DENVER POST (Apr. 17, 2019, 2:48 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/ 
04/16/colorado-oil-gas-bill-signed-gov-jared-polis/. 
 10. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(I) (prior to April 16, 2019). 
 11. S.B. 19-181, 72nd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019). 
 12. Id. 
 13. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-102 to 107 (2019). 
 14. Id. 
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on well site locations already approved by local governments.
15
 And, in a 
reversal of the old script, local governments are now authorized to adopt 
regulations more restrictive than those imposed by the COGCC.
16
 The Bill 
is silent as to whether or not a local government could adopt regulations 
less restrictive than those imposed by the COGCC.
17
  
For the regionalism fights in the Denver-Julesburg Colosseum, The Bill 
clearly forecloses the sort of litigation that became commonplace in the last 
thirty years. In a sense, The Bill serves as a legislative prosthetic for the 
Colorado Supreme Court’s parsimonious treatment of local law under 
Article XX. The General Assembly now expressly authorizes, and the 
COGCC shall recognize, local regulations more restrictive than those 
imposed by the state.  When Governor Polis signed The Bill into law, he 
hoped it would mark the end of the “oil and gas wars” in Colorado.
18
   
Governor Polis’s hope was misplaced. The newly amended LUEA and 
OGCA invites a new combatant to the colosseum – Weld County – the 
largest oil and gas producer in the State.
19
 Unlike other local entities who 
have entered the arena in the past, the constituents of Weld County 
generally favor the oil industry. Shortly after the passage of The Bill, Weld 
County designated the development of oil and gas as an area of local 
interest through the Colorado Areas and Activities of State Interest Act.
20
 
Pursuant to this designation and the authorities conferred to local 
governments by LUEA and Colorado’s home rule county provisions
21
, 
Weld County developed its own ordinances and the Weld County Oil and 
Gas Energy Department (“OGED”) to exercise Weld County’s new siting 
authorities.
22
  The COGCC takes issue to the creation of OGED and asserts 
that while local governments enjoy new authority to regulate oil and gas 
                                                                                                             
 15. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(1)(f) (2019). 
 16. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-131 (2019). 
 17. See id.; § 34-60-106(1)(f). 
 18. Judith Kohler, Six Months After Colorado’s Sweeping Oil and Gas Law Took Effect, 
Fight Over Path Forward Hasn’t Faded, THE DENVER POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 12:42 PM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/10/24/colorado-oil-gas-law-6-months-old-sb-181/. 
 19. Oil and Gas Energy Department, WELD COUNTY, (2020) https://www.weldgov.com/ 
departments/oil_and_gas_energy. 
 20. WELD CTY., COLO., CODE ch. 21, art. 1, div. 1, § 21-1-30, https://library.municode. 
com/co/weld_county/codes/charter_and_county_code?nodeId=CH21ARACSTIN_ARTIAD
RE_DIV1ININGE (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). 
 21. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-101 to 906; WELD CTY., COLO. supra note 20. 
 22. WELD COUNTY supra note 19.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/6
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under The Bill, this does not divest the COGCC of authority.
23
 Weld 
County argues the newly amended OGCA and LUEA reserve the authority 
to approve surface locations solely to local governments who have 
designated oil and gas as an area of local interest.  
For now, the COGCC and Weld County are at a truce. The County and 
COGCC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding by which the two 
parties will coordinate in a timely manner to review applications for the 
siting of new oil and gas wells.
24
 The gates to the colosseum remain open, 
however, and the rules of the arena are now different. In the future, courts 
will need to decide to what degree a locally created oil and gas department 
may exercise control over the industry within its boundaries. Parsed 
differently, to what extent does state law preempt local law under the new 
OGCA? The issue, considered through the many perplexing lenses of 
Colorado preemption case-law, might be realistically resolved in a number 
of different ways. Part II of this paper looks to the gritty details of Colorado 
preemption jurisprudence and how the OGCA now fits into this scheme.  
Colorado is not the only imperium in imperio state. Nor is Colorado the 
only imperium in imperio state with a prominent oil and gas presence. Part 
III looks to the storied jurisprudence of home rule preemption analysis in 
Oklahoma. In part IV, I argue the COGCC may not have its cake and eat it 
too – faithful adherence to the acts and case law indicate certain local 
regulations of oil and gas are not preempted by state law.  
II. Colorado Preemption Law 
A. Basis of Local Authority: Types of County and City Governments   
Article XX of the Colorado Constitution provides that the “charter and 
the ordinances” of a city or town “shall supersede within the territorial 
limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the state in 
conflict therewith.”
25
 Note that Article XX empowers properly chartered 
                                                                                                             
 23. Blair Miller, Colorado Oil and Gas Regulators Tell Weld County the COGCC 
Maintains Regulatory Authority: Letter Comes After County Oil and Gas Department 
Formed, THEDENVERCHANNEL.COM (Jul. 22, 2019, 8:10 PM), https://www.thedenver 
channel.com/news/politics/colorado-oil-and-gas-regulators-tell-weld-county-the-cogcc-
maintains-regulatory-authority. 
 24. Macie May, COGCC Provides Clarification for Designated Areas of State Special 
Interest, LONGMONT OBSERVER (Sept. 10, 2019), https://longmontobserver.org/featured/ 
cogcc-provides-clarification-for-designated-areas-of-state-special-interest/.  
 25. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. 
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home rule cities. Thus, two species of city exist in Colorado: local and 
home rule.  
The Colorado Supreme Court does not automatically construe Article 
XX as giving home rule cities and towns unqualified, plenary authority to 
govern within their boundaries.
26
 Rather, the court will ask if the regulated 
issue is “of local, state, or mixed local and statewide concern.”
27
 For issues 
of purely local concern, a home rule city has “plenary authority and is not 
inferior in authority to the Colorado General Assembly.”
28
 Accordingly, 
with regards to issues of statewide concern, state laws preempts local 
laws.
29
 When an issue is of both state and local concern, state law preempts 
local laws if the local law operationally conflicts with state law.
30
 
Regulations of statutory cities are not given the same treatment as home 
rule cities. For preemption analysis of a statutory city law, the courts will 
see if the statutory city has acted validly under the powers delegated to it. 
Assuming it has, the court will then turn to see if state law expressly, 
impliedly, or operationally conflicts with and preempts the local law.
31
 
Notably, county governments are not referenced in Article XX. Much 
like cities, two species of county exist in Colorado: home rule counties and 
statutory counties.
32
 Article XIV of the Colorado Constitution empowers 
counties to provide and exercise “such permissive powers as may be 
authorized by statute”.
33
  Home rule counties are given greater latitude than 
statutory counties to make regulations within their boundaries.
34
 Thus, 
regulations of statutory and home rule counties may be treated differently 
for purposes of the Colorado Supreme Court’s preemption analysis. For 
cases involving statutory counties, “the ordinary rules of statutory 
construction” are applied to “to determine whether a state statute and local 
ordinance can be construed harmoniously or whether the state statute 
preempts the local ordinance.”
35
 When the law of a statutory county 
conflicts with a specific state law addressing the matter, the court will not 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Ryals v. City of Englewood, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245 (D. Colo. 2013).  
 27. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002).  
 28. Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1245.  
 29. Id.   
 30. Id. 
 31. Joel Minor, Note, Local Government Fracking Regulations: A Colorado Case 
Study, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 94 (2014).  
 32. See Colo. Mining Ass’n. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Summit County, 199 P.3d 718, 
724 (Colo. 2009).  
 33. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 16. 
 34. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-35-102 to 201 (2019); Colo. Mining, 199 P.3d at 723. 
 35. Colo. Mining, 199 P.3d 718, 724 (Colo. 2009).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/6
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look to see if the issue is one of local, state, or mixed concern. Instead, the 
court will look to see if state law expressly preempts the local law or if the 
state law is “sufficiently dominant” to override the local interest.
36
 
Moreover, courts will treat county land use authority as presumptively valid 
but, unlike home rule cities, will constrain the authority of statutory 
counties to the powers expressly given to them by the General Assembly.
37
 
Only two true home rule counties, Pitkin County and Weld County, exist 
in Colorado.
38
 Broomfield County and Denver County are home rule 
counties to an extent but they differ from true home rule counties due to 
their unique status and constitutional provisions.
39
 Because home rule 
counties are so few, the courts have had little opportunity to determine how 
preemption analysis would work between home rule county and state law.
40
   
One commentator posits the courts will likely use the same analysis used 
for statutory counties in preemption analysis for home rule counties.
41
 The 
basis for this assertion is that home rule counties, unlike home rule cities, 
do not possess the same plenary powers.
42
 There is ambiguity on the 
subject, however, because the Colorado Supreme Court, in dicta, clumped 
home rule cities and counties within the same preemption analysis 
framework for purposes of land use authority.
43
 The Colorado Supreme 
Court did not expressly define the rationale behind this treatment. Article 
XIV § 16 makes no mention of preemption.
44
 It instead empowers home 
rule counties to exercise mandatory and permissive powers “as may be 
authorized by statute applicable to all home rule counties.”
45
  A likely 
explanation for this dicta treatment may be that Article XX § 6 provides the 
County of Denver, but only the County of Denver, with home rule 
                                                                                                             
 36. Id.  
 37. Minor, supra note 31, at 94.  
 38. COLO. LEGIS. COUNCIL STAFF, 2013 COLORADO LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 1, 
11 (2013), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/13%20Local%20Gov%20 
Handbook%20for%20posting.pdf. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Minor, supra note 31, at 95 (“[H]ome rule counties have a more ambiguous legal 
status than other Colorado local governments.”). 
 41. Id. (speculating that “a court would likely apply the same preemption analysis to a 
home rule county as a statutory county.”).  
 42. Id. 
 43. Colo. Mining Ass’n. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Summit County, 199 P.3d 718, 723 
(Colo. 2009).  
 44. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 16. 
 45. Id. 
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 The Colorado Constitution plainly does not empower all other 
home rule counties to the same extent as home rule cities.
47
 Therefore, 
existing speculation regarding the treatment of home rule counties is likely 
correct – home rule counties would be treated in the same manner as 
statutory counties or cities. The effect of this, then, is that even home rule 
counties, like Weld County, will largely be forced to follow the OGCA and 
comply with the rules of the COGCC.  
Home rule cities, on the other hand, enjoy greater status under Colorado 
preemption law. After The Bill there is a legitimate question as to whether 
the COGCC continues to possess full authority over home rule cities that 
elect to regulate oil and gas in a manner not conforming with the OGCA. In 
particular, how would the courts treat home rule city ordinances that 
endeavored to regulate oil and gas outside the confines of state law? The 
answer to this question is   found in the perplexing web of Colorado 
preemption jurisprudence.  
The observations presented herein come with a major caveat. Generally, 
the home rule doctrine and state preemption produces very unpredictable 
results.
48
 Unsatisfactorily, this same principle applies for the more niche 
area of Colorado home rule preemption jurisprudence.  State courts possess 
“a wealth of choices” in addressing conflict preemption.
49
 Mechanistic 
application of preemption doctrine suggests possible outcomes but no 
guarantees. Nevertheless, the stakes of home rule preemption litigation are 
high – especially for the oil and gas industry. Since the Bill became 
effective, approvals for permits to drill declined by about half.
50
 Without 
the help of Colorado state government, the best hope for operators to 
stimulate new drilling may be Colorado preemption doctrine. 
  
                                                                                                             
 46. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.  
 47. Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, When States’ Legislation and Constitutions Collide with 
Angry Locals: Shale Oil and Gas Development and Its Many Masters, 41 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 135 (2016). 
 48. Jacob Alderdice, Note, Impending Local Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy 
Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 464 (2013).  
 49. Daniel E. Kramer, Colorado Preemption Law, 48 COLO. LAW. 38, 43 (Apr. 2019).  
 50. Catherine Traywick, Tougher Drilling Rules Can’t Stop Colorado’s Oil Bonanza, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-
28/tougher-drilling-rules-can-t-stop-colorado-s-oil-bonanza. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/6
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B. Overview of Colorado Home Rule Preemption
C. Preemption Analysis for Home Rule Cities
Under home rule city preemption analysis, the court will ask if the issue
is one of local, statewide, or mixed concern.
51
 It is clear home rule city laws 
supersede a conflicting state statute in matters of local concern.
52
 In matters 
of statewide or mixed concern, the state law supersedes a conflicting city 
law.
53
 The classification of whether an issue is of local or statewide concern 
51. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016).
52. Id. at 579.
53. Id.
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is a legal question.
54
 Four factors are used to classify the nature of the 
matter: “(1) the need for statewide uniformity of regulation, (2) the 
extraterritorial impact of the local regulation, (3) whether the state or local 
governments have traditionally regulated the matter, and (4) whether the 
Colorado Constitution specifically commits the matter to either state or 
local regulation.”
55
  The following sections examine each factor under prior 
case law and changes to the OGCA. Although the OGCA may not have 
intended to divest the COGCC of regulatory power, the ultimate effect of 
the OGCA may be that home-rule municipalities are largely free to 
regulate, or not regulate, the oil and gas industry.  
1. Factor One, The Need for Statewide Uniformity 
Laws demand statewide uniformity when uniformity is necessary to 
achieve and maintain state goals and provide “uniform access and 
expectations of consistency.”
56
 The uniformity factor abhors a messy 
“patchwork approach” to legislation.
57
 In Ryals v. City of Englewood, the 
City of Englewood – a home rule city – defended the validity of an 
ordinance making it unlawful for a registered sex offender to establish a 
residence within two thousand feet of schools, playgrounds, bus stops, 
pools, recreational trails, and walk-to-school routes.
58
 This ordinance was 
challenged on the basis that state laws directing the Sex Offender 
Management Board preempted Englewood’s ordinance. In a certified 
question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, The Colorado Supreme Court held the uniformity factor weighed in 
favor of Englewood. Although the General Assembly characterized state 
law as comprehensively evaluating the treatment of adult sex offenders, 
state law was silent with regard to residency requirements of sex 
offenders.
59
  Furthermore, the language of the statute contemplated some 
role for local governments suggesting that although the General Assembly 
intended to effectuate some general uniformity, the statute significantly left 
“room for difference in the narrower area of residency regulation.”
60
  
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 580.  
 56. Ryals v. City of Englewood, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245 (D. Colo. 2013) (quoting 
City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161 (Colo. 2003)). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Ryals v. City of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900, 904 (Colo. 2016).  
 59. Id. at 906–907.  
 60. Id. at 907.  
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The litigants in Ryals settled before the Tenth Circuit could hold on the 
matter. However, much can be learned from comparing the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s certified answer to the holding of the District Court of 
Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court’s answer to the certified question 
differed from the conclusion the District Court of Colorado reached in its 
consideration of the ordinance.
61
 Uniformity would be subverted, the 
District Court concluded, if the comprehensive, best practices of the Sex 
Offender Management Board could be disregarded and supplanted by local 
law.
62
  Whether or not the state law was silent as to residency requirements 
was apparently not dispositive to the District Court.
63
 The District Court did 
not discuss what the Colorado Supreme Court found instructive, that state 
law contemplated some room for local ordinances.
64
  
The differences between the Colorado Supreme Court and District 
Court’s treatment of the uniformity factor are illuminating. Contrary to the 
District Court’s analysis, the Colorado Supreme Court seemed to conclude 
a desire for uniformity could not be evinced from the silence of state law 
with regard to residency requirements. Additionally, the Colorado Supreme 
Court made special note that the statute envisioned room for local 
governance. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the Colorado 
Supreme Court will not be quick to construe ambiguities in the state statute 
as favoring a need for uniformity. Second, the court will consider special 
powers given to local entities as weighing against a legislative desire for 
uniformity.  
In the context of oil and gas, the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held the OGCA demands uniform treatment of oil and gas throughout the 
state.
65
 The need for uniformity in oil and gas is twofold: geological 
formations do not track political boundaries and the correlative rights of 
mineral owners are protected through the efficient and even recovery of 
hydrocarbons.
66
 The new OGCA does not change the geological nature of 
subterranean pools of hydrocarbons but it marks a radical shift from a 
legislative scheme designed to favor correlative rights to one that defines 
waste as: “not includ[ing] the nonproduction of oil or gas from a formation 
                                                                                                             
 61. Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2013). 
 62. Ryals, 962 F. Supp. 2d. at1246.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 591 (Colo. 2016); 
City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 580 (Colo. 2016), 369 P.3d 573 
(2016); Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).  
 66. Longmont, 369 P.3d at 580.  
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if necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare, the environment, 
or wildlife resources as determined by the commission.”
67
  This choice of 
definition consciously chooses to leave mineral interest owners with little 
recourse should the nonproduction of oil and gas, as a result of local 
legislation, in one part of the reservoir result in a material depletion of their 
ability to recover from the reservoir in the future. Furthermore, the General 
Assembly removed language from the OGCA that formerly directed the 
COGCC to regulate the “balanced development” of oil and gas.
68
 
Correlative rights certainly continue to exist in Colorado but the newly 
amended OGCA evinces a legislative intent to trade the “balanced” 
development of geological formations for a scheme less concerned with 
even development of the reservoir.  
Moreover, the General Assembly, through the OGCA and LUEA, invites 
“patchwork” regulation. The OGCA now mandates that an operator must 
file an application with the local government for a surface application to 
drill before a drilling permit will be issued from the state.
69
  And, the 
OGCA goes on to expressly empower local governments with “regulatory 
authority over oil and gas development” and authorizes local entities to 
make regulations that are “more protective or stricter than state 
requirements.” Notably, the OGCA is silent as to whether or not a local 
entity may be less protective than state requirements.  
The rights of local governments, historically defeated in the arena, are 
further vindicated by the LUEA which now contemplates the regulation and 
siting of oil and gas well locations as areas of local interest.
70
 The sum of 
OGCA and LUEA is a legislative scheme that completely disregards 
uniformity. Although the OGCA begins with a legislative declaration that 
the COGCC shall be directed to “regulate the development and production 
of the natural resources of oil and gas in the State of Colorado,” an 
inference that this calls for uniformity of regulation is weak. Much like the 
use of the word “comprehensive” in the Sex Offender statute considered in 
Ryals, this alone will not be enough for the Colorado Supreme Court. By 
enacting The Bill, the General Assembly divorced the OGCA from its 
anchor to uniformity – balanced development of the reservoir – and invited 
a multitude of diverse regulations across the Denver Julesburg. If the 
Colorado Supreme Court were to revisit uniformity of oil and gas 
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regulations using a mechanistic approach, it would likely determine the 
uniformity factor now weighs in favor of the local entity.  
2. Factor Two, Extraterritorial Impact 
The need for extraterritorial impact factor in the court’s analysis is made 
evident by the language in Article XX § 6 which limits the scope of local 
law to the cities themselves.
71
 Extraterritorial impact is defined as “a ripple 
effect that impacts state residents” outside the local entity in a manner that 
has serious consequences amounting to more than merely incidental or de 
minimus impacts.
72
 However, the actual application of the extraterritorial 
impact often cuts against the local entity.
73
  Despite the rule’s cautionary 
qualification that extraterritorial consequences of a merely incidental nature 
will not weigh against the local entity, courts will often apply this in a 
manner that undercuts or redefines the importance of this qualification.
74
   
For example, in City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, the Colorado Supreme 
Court considered the extraterritorial impact of a Northglenn law that limited 
the placement of juvenile sex offenders in foster homes within 
Northglenn.
75
 The Colorado Supreme Court held the ordinance possessed 
an impermissible ripple effect because it would decrease available housing 
for adolescent sex offenders throughout the state.
76
 Decrease in overall 
housing in the state for adolescent sex offenders amounted to more than a 
merely incidental impact.
77
 Ibrarra’s characterization of the ordinance as 
having an extraterritorial impact is therefore instructive in determining how 
little courts will require to find that an ordinance, while applicable only in 
the city itself, actually has an extraterritorial nature.  
Extraterritorial impact analysis presents an additional wrinkle: the 
domino effect. After reading a court’s discussion of the domino effect, the 
reader may experience a distinct impression of déjà vu because the 
boundaries between the uniformity and extraterritorial factors are often 
blurred. Application of this rule will sometimes revisit a concept already 
                                                                                                             
 71. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. 
 72. City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161 (Colo. 2003).  
 73. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and The 
Region, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 1271 (2009) (arguing modern extraterritorial impact analysis 
restricts the scope of home rule powers).   
 74. Id. at 1278. 
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considered by the court in the uniformity factor: patchwork regulations.
78
 
When the Colorado Supreme Court discussed Ibrarra in Ryals, the 
Colorado Supreme Court placed special emphasis on the “domino effects” 
of the ordinance.
79
 The Colorado Supreme Court noted the ordinance 
threatened to breed patchwork regulations – an indication the issue may be 
of statewide or mixed concern.
80
 Under the uniformity analysis, patchwork 
regulations are indicative of a statewide or mixed issue if the General 
Assembly evinced some intent to avoid the same.  In the extraterritorial 
analysis however, the intent of the General Assembly does not appear to be 
as dispositive. Instead, the court will look to see if the nature of the 




Consideration of patchwork regulation under both factors is therefore 
capable of producing confounding results. For purposes of the uniformity 
test, a local law may be deemed to permissibly produce patchwork 
regulations because the General Assembly did not express a desire to avoid 
such results. This same law, under the extraterritoriality factor, will almost 
certainly be treated as impermissibly triggering patchwork regulations even 
though the General Assembly expressed no desire to avoid patchwork 
regulations. The treatment of patchwork regulations under extraterritorial 
impact analysis therefore subverts the promise of Article XX § 6 by 
threatening to foreclose local regulation of a matter even if the State has not 
expressed an interest in avoiding patchwork regulation of the issue. The 
rights enumerated to local cities and towns under Article XX § 6 were not 
granted conditionally on whether or not a local regulation might be 
followed by other cities. Colorado’s adoption of a home rule scheme 
reflects a policy choice to hazard patchworks of local regulatory schemes 
not forbidden, expressly or impliedly, by the General Assembly.  
In the oil and gas context, application of the extraterritoriality factor 
consistently cuts against the local entity.
82
 However, the calculus the 
Supreme Court of Colorado has employed to reach this conclusion varies. 
In Voss v. Lundvall Bros., the court held Greeley’s ordinances restricting oil 
                                                                                                             
 78. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 581 (Colo. 2016); 
Reynolds, supra note 73, at 1278. 
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591 (Colo. 2016); Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo. 1992).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/6
2020]  Balkanization in Oil and Gas 749 
 
 
and gas development possessed an impermissible extraterritorial effect 
because the uneven development of oil and gas along geological formations 
would result in increased production costs for operators and inequitable 
distributions of royalty payments to mineral owners in contravention of the 
OGCA.
83
 Voss therefore relied on an interpretation of relevant state law and 
the impact the ordinance would have on persons outside city limits. In City 
of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas Association, the Colorado Supreme 
Court drew from their opinion in Voss but added in the domino effect 
wrinkle of Ibarra.
84
  Longmont held that the environmentally restrictive 
ordinance might encourage other cities to follow suit.
85
  
Had the Colorado Supreme Court limited their analysis of the 
extraterritorial impact factor simply by affirming Voss, the court would 
have arrived at the same conclusion – that the ordinance possessed an 
extraterritorial impact. Yet, critically, Longmont introduces a new, almost 
impossible hurdle for local entities by applying the domino effect wrinkle. 
For Longmont, this additional wrinkle is not dispositive but for other cases 
it may be significant. If the Colorado Supreme Court considers local 
regulations of oil and gas reaching beyond the scope of the amended 
OGCA, the local entity will almost certainly lose on the extraterritoriality 
factor under the Longmont approach. However, if the Colorado Supreme 
Court returns to its analysis in Voss, the local ordinance is less likely to be 
characterized as pertaining to an issue of mixed or statewide concern 
because the analysis of the court will be limited to considering the OGCA 
and consequences of the ordinance to persons outside the local boundaries.  
In Voss and Longmont, the Court held the local ordinance to be in 
contravention of the OGCA due to its disregard of mineral interest owners. 
The newly amended OGCA divorces itself from these same concerns by 
shifting to a legislative scheme more concerned with the protection of 
health, safety, and the environment than the equitable treatment of mineral 
interest owners.
86
 This does not mean, however, that new language in the 
OGCA will not lend itself towards characterization of the ordinance as 
possessing extraterritorial impacts. Depending on the nature of the local 
ordinance, the Colorado Supreme Court might view the regulation as 
jeopardizing “public health, safety, and welfare” of persons and wildlife 
outside the boundaries of the local entity.
87
  On the other hand, certain local 
                                                                                                             
 83. Voss, 830 P.2d at 1067.  
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regulations of oil and gas may not be deemed to be of an extraterritorial 
nature.  
To sum this all up, a challenged ordinance regulating oil and gas will 
likely be treated as possessing an extraterritorial impact if it is viewed under 
the same lens as Longmont. However, if the ordinance is treated in the same 
vein as the ordinance in Voss, the nature of the ordinance and language of 
the statute will be dispositive. An ordinance yielding results contrary to the 
safety, health, and environmental aims of the OGCA would almost certainly 
be deemed as being extraterritorial in nature. However, an ordinance that 
tracks the language of the OGCA will most likely not have an 
extraterritorial impact under the Voss framework.  
3. Factor Three, Traditional Regulation  
The third factor in determining whether an issue is of statewide or local 
concern looks to historical regulation of the issue by state and local 
authorities.
88
 This analysis is centered around a desire to adequately 
preserve regulation of the matter by traditional authorities. In Voss, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that the issue of oil and gas regulation is a 
matter traditionally governed by state authorities.
89
 In their discussion of the 
issue, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the General 
Assembly created the COGCC, issues of Oil and Gas regulation constituted 
a matter of statewide concern. Later, in Longmont and Fort Collins, the 
Colorado Supreme Court revisited their reasoning in Voss and concluded 
the regulation of oil and gas instead constituted a matter traditionally 
regulated by both state and local authorities.
90
 Longmont and Fort Collins 
repudiated Voss in this regard because the Colorado Supreme Court 
recognized the regulation of oil and gas is governed by the COGCC as well 
as municipalities with zoning authority.
91
  So, even before the General 
Assembly amended the OGCA, the third factor cut both ways. Under the 
old paradigm, the law recognized regulation of oil and gas as an area of law 
traditionally regulated by both state and local governments.  
The newly amended OGCA “provide[s] broad authority to local 
governments to plan for and regulate the use of land”.
92
 However, the 
General Assembly was careful not to express a policy too munificent. Their 
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 89. Id. at 1068.  
 90. City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 586, 591 (Colo. 2016); 
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grant to local governments came with a caveat: “nothing in this article shall 
serve to diminish the planning functions of the state or the duties of the 
division of planning.”
93
 Thus, the policy of the new OGCA affirms the 
traditional status quo and recognizes a system of dual regulation by both 
local and state governments.  There is no reason, then, for the traditional 
factor analysis in Longmont and Fort Collins to be disturbed by new 
legislation. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, in 2016, that the 
regulation of oil and gas is a matter of both state and local concern. There is 
little reason to think that legislative developments disturbed this portion of 
the analysis in Longmont and Fort Collins.  
4. Factor Four, Colorado Constitution 
The final step of Colorado preemption analysis looks to whether the 
Colorado Constitution commits regulation of the matter to either state or 
local authorities.
94
 At first glance, this may seem simple enough: the 
Colorado Constitution either says or doesn’t say a matter is reserved for 
state or local authorities. In reality, the Colorado Supreme Court’s analysis 
of this factor fails to produce clear and bright line results. Confusion on this 
point is attributed to the “inherent tension” at play “between competing 
constitutional and statutory provisions.”
95
 On one hand, home rule 
provisions in Article XX § 6 of the Colorado Constitution grant local 
authorities with broad land use control.
96
 On the other hand, the OGCA 
reserves certain powers over oil and gas regulation to the state. Conflict 
between these competing areas should be resolved in favor of towns and 
cities because the General Assembly is restricted from legislatively 
depriving a right contained within the Colorado Constitution.
97
  Despite 
these constitutional provisions, the Colorado Supreme Court tends to weigh 
this factor in favor of the state.
98
 
Ibrarra and Voss provide some explanation as to why this fourth factor is 
so onerous for local entities. Ibrarra noted that while home rule powers in 
Article XX § 6 are broad, the constitution does not expressly provide for 
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 94. City of Northglenn v. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d 151, 162 (Colo. 2003).  
 95. Kevin J. Duffy, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing Through Land Use: State 
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 96. Minor, supra note 31, at 90.  
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local regulation over oil and gas.
99
 This silence, therefore, means the fourth 
factor weighs in favor of the state. Similarly, Voss reasoned that local 
entities enjoyed constitutional power to regulate land-use but this 
constitutional power yielded to state goals expressed in state legislation.
100
   
Sometime after Voss and Ibrarra, in 2008, Telluride v. San Miguel 
Valley signified a change in reasoning for the court.
101
 Although the 
Colorado Supreme Court did not expressly overturn Ibrarra or Voss, the 
reasoning employed in Telluride represents a massive departure in the 
court’s constitutional analysis. In Voss, the court limited the scope of 
Article XX home rule powers to better conform the actions of home-rule 
municipalities to the mandates of the General Assembly.
102
  Corporate 
challengers to the city of Telluride’s home rule authorities patterned their 
argument from the logic in Voss: Article XX should be constrained by acts 
of the General Assembly, the corporate challenger in Telluride contended. 
Telluride rejected this argument, repudiating the logic of Voss. Plainly, 
Telluride announced that “the legislature cannot prohibit the exercise of 
constitutional home rule powers, regardless of the state interests which may 
be implicated by the exercise of those powers.”
103
 So, where the actions of 
the municipality concern matters of local issues, the legislative acts of the 
General Assembly are preempted by Article XX and the ordinances of the 
municipality.  
Telluride went one step further. Ibrarra announced tiers of importance 
interpreting Article XX. If Article XX did not explicitly enumerate a 
municipal power, Voss stated, then Article XX could not be said to directly 
address the matter for purposes of constitutional preemption analysis.
104
  
The corporate challenger in Telluride argued that tiers of condemnation 
power existed in Article XX – those express and implied.
105
 Telluride 
refused this argument too, “we reject the notion that there are two separate 
echelons of condemnation powers under Article XX”.
106
 Of course, 
questions remain as to how this piece of Telluride should be interpreted. 
Does this mean that there are no echelons of implied and express powers in 
Article XX or did Telluride speak only to powers of condemnation 
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 103. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 170.  
 104. Ibrarra, 62 P.3d at 162. 
 105. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 170.  
 106. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/6
2020]  Balkanization in Oil and Gas 753 
 
 
enumerated in Article XX? Article XX § 6 makes no explicit mention of 
condemnation powers.
107
 This lends credence to the argument that Telluride 
dispelled the notion that any categories of express or implied powers exist 
in Article XX. So long as the power is deemed to be local through a 
preemption analysis, it should then be protected by Article XX and is 
beyond the purview of legislative interference.  
Interestingly, however, it would seem that the impacts of Telluride have 
been cabined to the realm of Article XX jurisprudence only as it pertains to 
condemnation authority. In Longmont, the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
discussion of the fourth factor made no mention of Telluride.
108
 Instead, the 
Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed Voss. Puzzlingly, the Colorado 
Supreme Court was reticent to explain why; simply stating the Constitution 
makes no explicit mention of fracking.
109
 Therefore, the fourth factor 
cannot weigh in favor of either the state or the city.
110
  
Distillation of this fourth factor in preemption jurisprudence produces a 
schizophrenic framework. First, the General Assembly is prohibited from 
legislating away powers given to home-rule municipalities regardless of 
whether or not those powers are expressly enumerated by Article XX. This 
means little, however, because the fourth factor of preemption analysis 
permits the judiciary to apply in reasoning what it says is forbidden: look to 
whether a matter is expressly stated in Article XX. So, if the court applies 
all four factors and determines a matter is of a local character, the General 
Assembly is prohibited from legislating away that power regardless of 
whether the power is expressly listed in Article XX. Nevertheless, a matter 
of a purportedly local character, not expressly listed in Article XX, is less 
likely to receive the protection of Telluride because the fourth factor is 
squarely at odds with the basic concept that legislative acts shall not divest 
municipalities of their constitutional powers.  
All of this does not mean that courts should dispense of the fourth factor 
test altogether. It is still crucial to determine whether or not the Colorado 
Constitution commits a matter to state or local authority. However, many 
issues of a local character are not expressly listed by Article XX because 
Article XX was not intended to serve as a narrow or exhaustive list of local 
powers.
111
 The fourth factor test should then be modified with a corollary: if 
the Colorado Constitution is silent as to the governance of the matter, can it 
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 109. Id. at 581.  
 110. Id.  
 111. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. 
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be inferred that the issue belongs to the powers broadly enumerated in 
Article XX § 6? If so, the fourth factor should weigh in favor of the 
municipality.  
Current application of the court’s fourth factor test should not, in theory, 
hinge in anyway on legislative developments of the General Assembly. 
Voss, however, informs that the courts will weigh the fourth factor as 
cutting neither in favor of the municipality or state if the matter is not 
expressly listed in Article XX and the General Assembly speaks on the 
matter. It is likely then that if the Colorado Supreme Court were to 
readdress the oil and gas preemption analysis in light of amendments to the 
OGCA, it would not depart from previous holdings. The fourth factor 
would then weigh neither in favor of the state or the home rule city.  
5. Applying all Four Factors 
Under the new OGCA, it is now possible for a municipality to enter the 
colosseum and successfully argue the regulation of oil and gas concerns a 
purely local matter. If oil and gas is deemed to be a local matter, home rule 
cities intent on regulating oil and gas in a manner less restrictive than state 
law will be able to do so. The uniformity factor likely now weights in favor 
of the local entity. The traditional analysis and constitutional factors will 
likely continue to cut both ways as they did before the Bill. Lastly, 
application of the extraterritorial factor will be especially sensitive to the 
nature of the local ordinance. Before The Bill, courts used the correlative 
rights of mineral owners and the health of the reservoir as the logical 
underpinnings to support reasoning that the regulation of oil and gas 
produced extraterritorial impacts. The Bill now expressly authorizes 
municipalities to regulate oil and gas in a manner more restrictive than state 
law. The new OGCA, therefore, prioritizes the health and safety concerns 
of municipal governments over more traditional concerns regarding 
extraterritorial impact of oil and gas regulation. When courts reanalyze the 
extraterritorial impact of oil and gas regulation they will either reason this 
factor weighs in favor of the local entity or draw on the new language of the 
OGCA to conclude new extraterritorial impact results from a local oil and 
gas regulation.  
It must be reiterated that Colorado preemption jurisprudence is 
mercurial.
112
 While projections taken from a mechanical extrapolation of 
existing jurisprudence are alluring, they provide little guarantees. If the 
court characterizes the local regulation as being of a local concern, the 
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analysis ends. A local entity’s law will supersede state law if the matter is 
characterized as a local concern.
113
  It is possible that a court could deem oil 
and gas to be a local concern and painlessly resolve the dispute in favor of 
the local entity. If, however, the regulation is characterized as an issue of 
state or mixed concern, the court is required to determine whether the local 
regulation is expressly, impliedly, or operationally preempted by state 
law.
114
 In previous oil and gas preemption cases, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held the OGCA did not expressly or impliedly preempt the efforts of 
local entities to prohibitively regulate matters of mixed state and local 
concern.
115
 Instead, the court held local regulations were operationally 
preempted by state law.
116
  It is therefore necessary to consider the second, 
distinct test of Colorado preemption analysis: conflict analysis.  
D. Conflict Preemption Analysis     
The launching point for preemption analysis of county and statutory city 
regulations begins with conflict preemption analysis.
117
 This is also the 
second, conditional step for home rule city regulations pertaining to matters 
of statewide or mixed concern.
118
 There are three ways a local law may be 
preempted: expressly, operationally, or impliedly.
119
 Express preemption 
occurs when the General Assembly expressly preempts the local law.
120
 
Implied preemption exists where a state law broadly addresses a particular 
issue in such a thorough manner that it implicitly preempts local laws.
121
 
Operational preemption is a peculiar animal. “Mere overlap in subject 
matter” of state and local law “is not sufficient” to preempt the local law.
122
 
For the local law to be operationally preempted, the local law must 
materially impede or destroy a state interest.
123
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The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently held express and implied 
preemption are not at play when considering preemption analysis in the 
context of oil and gas preemption.
124
 Given the nature of changes to the 
OGCA – granting more control to local entities – it seems unlikely the new 
OGCA will be held to expressly or impliedly preempt local ordinances 
regulating oil and gas.
125
 However, this does not mean that the OGCA 
could be further amended to expressly preempt certain local oil and gas 
regulations. Weld County’s attempt to wrest power from the hands of the 
COGCC and assume all authority over the siting of oil and gas wells 
prompted some lawmakers to reconsider the language of the OGCA. On 
January 15, 2020, lawmakers introduced HB 20-1126.
126
 HB 20-1126 
offered to amend language in the OGCA regarding the siting of oil and gas 
wells. As the OGCA and LUEA are currently written, only applicable local 
entities possess the authority to approve or deny permits for surface well 
locations.
127
 HB 20-1126 threatened to qualify this power by stating all 
surface well location permits are subject to approval by the director of the 
COGCC.
128
  If HB 20-1126 became law, it would expressly foreclose Weld 
County’s ambitions to act as the sole authority for approval of surface 
location permits. Given current trends in Colorado politics, it seemed 
probable HB 20-1126 would become law. Surprisingly, however, on March 




The short-lived existence of HB 20-1126 underscores just how easily the 
state could divest oil and gas regulatory powers from statutory entities and 
home rule counties through express preemption.  Dissimilarly, home rule 
cities are relatively more immune to threats of express preemption. In 
Telluride, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a land use statute as it 
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Implied preemption exists when the scope of the statute demonstrates a 
legislative intent of the state to “completely occupy a field to the exclusion 
of all other regulation.”
131
 The term implied generally inspires thoughts of 
clever litigators who manage to conjure up novel purposes for a statute. The 
threshold for implied preemption is higher than the term suggests. Indeed, 
“mere overlap in subject matter is not sufficient to void a local 
ordinance.”
132
 In Bowen/Edwards, the court rejected an invitation to 
construe the OGCA as impliedly preempting local regulatory efforts.
133
  As 
the newest iteration of the OGCA contemplates even more local regulatory 
involvement, it is not plausible to think the Colorado Supreme Court would 
disturb the reasoning of Bowen/Edwards.  
In the home rule battles of the Denver Julesberg, operational preemption 
is most often responsible for ending the local regulation.
134
 An operational 
conflict is implicated when the local regulation “materially impede[s] or 
destroy[s] a state interest.”  In Fort Collins, the city instituted a lengthy 
moratorium on fracking.
135
  This moratorium infringed on the clear interest 
of the state in promoting efficient, responsible, and uniform development of 
oil and gas resources.
136
 For similar reasons, the moratorium in Longmont 
also failed to survive an operational preemption analysis.
137
 
Fort Collins placed emphasis on the state’s interest in promoting 
responsible and balanced development of oil and gas.
138
  Since Fort Collins, 
the terms responsible and balanced have been stricken.
139
 Now, oil and gas 
pools are intended to produce “up to [a] maximum efficient rate of 
production, subject to the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, 
the environment, and wildlife resources.”
140
  So, moratoriums that were 
once considered operationally preempted by state law are now in harmony.  
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In Ryals, the Colorado Supreme Court answered a certified question 
from the Tenth Circuit as to whether a city ordinance was preempted by 
state law.
141
  The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned residency restrictions 
imposed on sex offenders were a matter of mixed state and local concern.
142
  
Nevertheless, the court went on, the ordinance was not in operational 
conflict with state law.
143
 To begin, nothing in Colorado’s state sex offender 
scheme “prevents home-rule cities from banning sex offenders from 
residing within city limits.”
144
  The challenger to the ordinance grasped at a 
state provision requiring state officers to approve sex offenders’ new 
residences.
145
  This state provision, the challenger asserted, qualified as a 
conflict between state law and the ordinance.
146
   
Finding an operational conflict, however, is not a game of statutory 
‘Where’s Waldo’. Ryals explains that merely pointing out a state law on the 
matter is not sufficient to conclude operational preemption. Real friction, 
not fictional friction, must exist. Ryals points out that the friction here is 
fictional: “[s]tate approval of a sex offender’s application does not imply 
that a city must approve it. On the contrary, state approval is but one 
prerequisite to relocating…[t]hus, state law on the subject of sex offender 
registry recognizes that local ordinances play an important role in 
determining residency.”
147
 The ordinance in Ryals does not defeat the 
purpose of state law nor does it grind against operation of state law, it 
merely serves to locally supplement an area of state law.  
Operational or conflict preemption is no ‘Where’s Waldo’ exercise but it 
is not nearly as rigorous as the meandering test of matter characterization 
for home rule cities. The test is straight forward: does the home rule city’s 
law authorize what state law forbids, or prohibit what is authorized?
148
 
Clearly, then, any effort taken by a county or statutory city to defeat state 
regulations would be operationally preempted. However, local entities may 
have room to creatively and exclusively exercise authority as it pertains to 
surface location permitting and land disturbance issues. Under the OGCA, 
local entities are granted the authority to plan for and regulate the location 
                                                                                                             
 141. Ryals v. City of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900, 903 (Colo. 2016).  
 142. Id. at 908.  
 143. Id. at 909.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1284 (Colo. 2002).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/6
2020]  Balkanization in Oil and Gas 759 
 
 
and siting of oil and gas wells.
149
  Nevertheless, pursuant to Weld County’s 
Memorandum of Understanding with the COGCC, Weld County agreed to 
cede surface permitting authority to the COGCC.
150
  Weld County has not 
flourished as a result of the Bill or the Memorandum of Understanding. 
Permit approvals are down by over 50% since the Bill became effective 
and, as a result, Weld County will lose out on millions in tax revenue.
151
 
So, why would Weld County agree to this Memorandum of 
Understanding? While Weld County now possesses the sole power to 
approve surface permits to drill, the COGCC retained the power to approve 
permits to drill. Therefore, an operator seeking to drill in Weld County 
would still be required to obtain approval from the County for the surface 
location of the well and the State for the actual drilling of the well. Thus, 
operators and Weld County are still required to go through the State in 
order to bring a well to completion. Furthermore, as evidenced by the 
introduction and tabling of HB 20-1126, it would not be terribly difficult 
for the General Assembly to simply amend the OGCA and essentially 
codify the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. So, Weld County 
can try and expedite surface permitting for operators but this means very 
little if the COGCC does not promptly respond to applications for permits 
to drill.  
III. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma, like Colorado, is an imperium in imperio state.
152
  Oklahoma 
and Colorado share similar constitutional DNA as Article XVIII of the 
Oklahoma Constitution provides a basis for home rule municipal 
authority.
153
 Under Article XVIII, “a city charter supersedes conflicting 
state law on matters of purely municipal concern.”
154
  So, like Colorado, an 
Oklahoma home rule city may enact ordinances that supersede state law 
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when those laws pertain to a purely municipal concern. The similarities 
continue. Since 1934 and for years thereafter, a number of Oklahoma 
litigants invoked Article XVIII authority in an attempt to hoist local law 
above state law and curb oil and gas development.
155
 Moreover, the 
Oklahoma Legislature, like the Colorado General Assembly, recently felt 
compelled by oil and gas home rule litigation to legislate on the issue.
156
   
Dive deeper into the Oklahoma and Colorado home rule sagas, however, 
and dissimilarities begin to appear. The guiding case in Oklahoma for home 
rule preemption in the context of oil and gas is a 1934 Oklahoma Supreme 
Court Case, Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust.
157
 There, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a local ordinance may validly restrict 
an otherwise lawful oil and gas operation if the local ordinance 
circumscribes a private property use that is “inconsistent with the 
promotion of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the 
community.” In Beveridge, four factors are relevant: character of 
improvements on the property; proximity to other improved property; the 
possible and probable effect of oil development on the area as it is now 
situated; and its probable effect on the future growth and development of 
the city.
158
 The Oklahoma test, therefore, does not engage in the same 
characterization factors as Colorado. Instead, Oklahoma courts will look to 
factors relevant to the location of the operations, the purpose of the 
restriction, and the characteristics of the locale.
159
 Arguably, administration 
of this simpler Oklahoma test produces more favorable results for local 
entities than the Colorado test. For instance, Beveridge held that zoning 




Since 1934, however, a number of legal developments eroded hope that 
Beveridge would serve as an environmental sword against oil and gas 
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development in municipalities. Three decades after Beveridge, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court revisited the issue in Clouser.
161
 In Clouser, the 
city of Norman zoned plaintiff lessor’s acreage to restrict oil and gas 
development on the premises.
162
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that 
this was an impermissible exercise of local power as the factors implicated 
in Beveridge were not present in Clouser.
163
 Unlike the valid Oklahoma 
City zoning prohibition on drilling, the Norman prohibition was arbitrary, 
Clouser reasoned, because the prohibition extended to an area not densely 
populated.
164
  Moreover, the area was generally unimproved and, 
furthermore, oil and gas development “could not affect other areas nor 
could it affect the future development of the city.”
165
 Clouser’s succinct 
application of the Beveridge factors severely limited the potential scope and 
punch Beveridge may have possessed when it was first decided.   
Many decades after Beveridge and Clouser, in 2015, the Oklahoma 
Legislature directly addressed the issue of oil and gas regulation by local 
entities.
166
  Title 52 § 137.1 authorizes a local entity to establish reasonable 
setbacks and fencing requirements but expressly prohibits a local entity 
from “effectively prohibit[ing] or ban[ning] any oil and gas operations.”
167
  
Moreover, §137.1 provides, “all other regulations of oil and gas operations 
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [Oklahoma] Corporation 
Commission”.
168
  The effect of §137.1 is succinctly described by the 
legislative history of the law. An Oklahoma Committee Report on the bill, 
later codified as §137.1, describes it as “prohibiting regulation by local 
entities.”
169
  Shortly after the passage of §137.1, the Oklahoma Attorney 
General issued an opinion on the effect of the bill. The regulation of oil and 
gas is a statewide concern, the opinion explained, because the oil and gas 
industry is crucial to the Oklahoma economy and concerns a great number 
of Oklahomans across the state.
170
 As the regulation of oil and gas is now 
designated as an issue of statewide concern, the effect of §137.1 is to 
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preempt prohibitive local regulation of both chartered and non-chartered 
cities.
171
   
So, while the Colorado General Assembly vested local entities with more 
authority to prohibitively regulate the oil and gas industry, the Oklahoma 
Legislature expressly preempted local entities from effectively banning the 
production of oil and gas. The comparison of the Colorado and Oklahoma 
approaches sheds light on the proper place of federalism and home rule in 
the context of oil and gas regulation.  
From an industry perspective, legislative developments in Oklahoma are 
a huge win. The Oklahoma Legislature shut the door to the sort of litigation 
the Colorado Supreme Court entertained in the past three decades. 
Conversely, legislative developments in Colorado restrain the industry with 
a myriad of new regulations. No doubt, the new OGCA is a win for 
environmentalists in Colorado. At first glance, the take-away from these 
two cases may suggest that the implementation of home rule regulation 
favors environmentalist movements and impedes the oil industry.  
This conclusion, however, is reductive.  First, it isn’t entirely appropriate 
to characterize the novel versions of the LUEA or the OGCA as pro-home 
rule or federalist. More accurately, the amended OGCA endeavors to 
empower local entities only to act more prohibitively than what is mandated 
by the state.
172
 Second, the authorities delegated to local entities in 
Colorado are still subject to drilling permitting approval through the 
COGCC.
173
 Crucially, the amended OGCA changed the composition of the 
COGCC directors from individuals experienced in the industry to a 
majority of individuals with little industry experience.
174
 The COGCC is 
now comprised of individuals concerned less with the industry and more 
with health, safety, and the environment. Perhaps, partially as a result of 




Practically speaking, Colorado is using the façade of federalism to 
strangle the oil industry pursuant to the General Assembly’s objective of 
diminishing industry in the state. The façade of federalism underlying The 
Bill was necessary due to statewide voter sentiment regarding oil and 
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 Legislators couldn’t risk implementing an act transparently hostile to 
the industry as Colorado voters soundly defeated an anti-oil and gas 
proposition in 2018.
177
 The solution, then, was to try and utilize home rule 
provisions in conjunction with COGCC changes to completely foreclose oil 
and gas development in many counties and slow it in others.  A true 
federalist solution should serve the local needs of each community. The Bill 
certainly does not do that.  
Conversely, the Oklahoma Legislature acted very transparently. In no 
uncertain terms, §137.1 directs the state to dominate the regulation of oil 
and gas.
178
 Consistent with widespread trends across the country to reduce 
local powers, §137.1 reduces the significance of Article XVIII powers. In 
Colorado, such an act might be deemed unconstitutional under Telluride as 
it may impermissibly divest local authorities of their constitutional 
powers.
179
 Today, §137.1 represents a great legislative victory for the 
industry.  
In years to come, however, the industry may come to regret the violence 
§137.1 has done to Article XVIII. If §137.1 is not considered 
unconstitutional, what would stop the Oklahoma Legislature from 
implementing statewide bans of oil and gas in the future? To many in 
Oklahoma today, the prospect of such a dramatic change in state legislative 
tides may seem unfathomable. Keep in mind, however, that the prospect of 
anti-industry legislation in Colorado was not on the horizon in the 1980s. 
As appealing as §137.1 may be today for the industry, it may, in the future, 
be seen as a Faustian bargain.  
Let’s unpack what this bargain entails. In sum, if the industry sticks with 
§137.1, they gain the sword of state law and lose the shield of home rule 
constitutional provisions. Through §137.1, the industry tethers its future 
existence in Oklahoma to the State Legislature. So long as the state 
legislature remains favorable to the industry, the industry continues to exist.  
This is a big bet for the industry but, given the current political climate in 
Oklahoma, probably safe one.  
Home rule provisions in both Colorado and Oklahoma should be 
faithfully defended by the courts.  The growing rift between 
environmentalist urban areas and rural areas reliant on the oil industries can 
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be reconciled through true principles of federalism. Neither the amended 
OGCA nor the provisions of §137.1 strike this balance. On one end, 
urbanites in Denver and Boulder have deprived the people of Weld County 
of economic prosperity. If Boulderites wish to restrict the oil and gas 
industry in their own backyard, that is their prerogative. It is not their place 
to halt oil development in Weld County and diminish an industry that has 
provided generations of Coloradans with jobs and opportunities. Similarly, 
§137.1 divests larger urban areas from regulating oil and gas in a manner 
appropriate for a more populated region. The unintended consequence of 
§137.1 may be to galvanize metropolitan Oklahomans against the industry 
and deprive municipalities from making responsible, local regulations. The 
solution to this problem is in the constitutions of both states: enact 
legislation consistent with home rule provisions to give cities and counties 
wide-ranging autonomy to regulate these issues.  
IV. Conclusion 
Today and for the past thirty years, the oil and gas preemption litigation 
in Colorado exemplifies a growing rift among Coloradans. Since the 1970s, 
oil and gas has been and continues to be an important part of the state 
economy.
180
 Not all of Colorado relies on oil and gas, however.  As of 
2014, 96% of oil production originated from five counties.
181
  Many 
Coloradans, most outside of producing counties, see oil and gas as an 
antiquated and harmful industry.
182
 From 2000 to 2018, Colorado has 
gained over a million residents.
183
  With this growth, Colorado’s economy 
is becoming more diversified and the oil and gas industry is now one of 
many industries in a broader economic profile.
184
  The ultimate result is that 
legislators and voters are pushing to change the oil and gas industry in 
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Colorado – even if it means oil and gas producing counties are casualties to 
stricter regulations.  
As of 2019, Colorado produced an average of 514,000 barrels of oil per 
day.
185
 In ad valorem taxes alone, the industry produces, on average, 350 
million in taxes annually.
186
  Colorado voters, too, seem to recognize the 
importance of the industry. In 2018, Colorado voters defeated Proposition 
112, an initiative designed to increase oil and gas setbacks to 2,500 feet 
from things as ubiquitous as “irrigation canals” and as vague as “vulnerable 
areas designated by state or a local government.”
187
  While SB 19-181 is 
vexing for the industry, Proposition 112 posed a much more menacing 
threat to oil and gas development in Colorado.  
For proponents of the oil and gas industry in Colorado, the future is 
uncertain. The newly amended OGCA brings a new host of regulatory 
hurdles to tackle. Regulatory challenges are not novel for the oil and gas 
industry. In the past nine years, Colorado enacted fifteen different oil and 
gas rulemakings.
188
  Nevertheless, the long string of new regulations do not 
satisfy many political groups in Colorado. Colorado Rising, an 
environmentalist group, is currently gathering steam to introduce six new 
ballot initiatives contemplating the regulation of oil and gas.
189
  Five of 
these ballot proposals are “replicas or close cousins” of the defeated 
Proposition 112.
190
 Employees and beneficiaries of the Colorado oil and gas 
industry are caught playing a costly game of whack-a-mole. In order to 
defeat Proposition 112, key Colorado producers donated more than 30 
million dollars.
191
 No matter how well the industry lobbies in an election 
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cycle, it seems certain anti-industry proponents will be back the next cycle 
to ask Colorado voters whether the industry needs to be limited.  
A strong argument exists that the regulation of oil and gas is now a 
purely local issue. The state has certainly not relinquished all power over 
the regulation of oil and gas but the new OGCA is so local friendly that it 
may tip the scales of a preemption analysis in favor of home rule entities 
and permit a court to characterize regulation as a matter of purely local 
concern. It is now probable that all four factors of operational preemption 
analysis: uniformity, extraterritorial impact, traditional regulation, and 
constitutional treatment tend to weigh more in favor of home rule 
municipalities than the state. If the Colorado Supreme Court taps into the 
same analytical vein as Telluride, the courts will almost certainly divest the 
COGCC of some authority and cede home rule cities with the power to 
regulate oil and gas.   
When the General Assembly amended the OGCA, it did so under the 
guise that it would afford local entities more control but only so long as that 
control was used in a manner more restrictive than state law mandated.
192
 
Presumably, the intent of the OGCA was to resolve the sort of municipal 
litigation seen in the past. More realistically, the amended OGCA forces 
operators to contend with a balkanized landscape of state, city, and county 
regulations.   
Counties, both home rule and statutory, are largely at the mercy of state 
law. Pro industry home-rule municipalities may be able to find some 
optimism in the OGCA, however.  New language in the OGCA may enable 
home rule municipalities to govern oil and gas in a more industry friendly 
manner than the state. Mechanical contours of preemption law can only 
guide exploration of this issue so far – a key component of this area of 
jurisprudence hinges on broad judicial discretion.
193
 Given the growing rift 
between regions in Colorado, it seems most appropriate to reserve the issue 
of oil and gas regulation to federalism and permit home-rule cities to 
govern in accordance with the Colorado Constitution.  
In a passionate dissent in Community Communications, Justice 
Rehnquist applauded the home rule movement as a key component of 
federalism.
194
  The Colorado home rule city of Boulder lost that case. 
Boulder contended that it should, as a sovereign, enjoy the benefit of the 
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state action exemption from liability of the Sherman Act.
195
  Justice 
Rehnquist lamented, perhaps too hyperbolically, “the decision today 
effectively destroys the ‘home rule’ movement in this country, through 
which local governments have obtained, not without persistent state 
opposition, a limited autonomy over matters of local concern.”
196
  This 
characterization of the fight was accurate but the prediction was not. Home 
rule rights are certainly not dead. In fact, constitutional home rule 
provisions remain as an important tool of federalism in imperium in imperio 
states. The DJ Basin is calling, again, for combatants. Crucially, home rule 
preemption litigation may now be restored as a promising weapon for local 
entities. I like to think that Justice Rehnquist would be pleasantly surprised 
to see home rule entities prepared to enter the fray to vindicate federalism 
and the home rule movement.   
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